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INTRODUCTION
An investment project has effects on the incomes of households, firms and
government, not only directly through the value added produced by the project
itself, but also by inducing additional output through interindustry linkages and
expenditures out of the extra incomes accruing to its beneficiaries. The latter,
sometimes called the "multiplier" or "downstream" effects of a project, have been
discussed in some of the recent literature on social cost -benefit analysis [6, 11].
These contributions have been concerned with the "multiplier" or "downstream"
effects of projects, and with the derivation of shadow prices which capture all such
effects in full. If these shadowprices are correctly calculated, so it is asserted, then
valuinga project's direct inputs and outputs at these prices yields the right measure
of its social profitability. This approach is in the spirit of, and consistent with, that
ofthev~riousmanualsonsocialcost-benefitanalysis [9,13,16].
This paper also deals with the problem of allowing fully for multiplier effects
in project evaluation, but approaches it on a different tack. Here, the total (direct
and indirect) impact of a project on outputs, incomes, savings and expenditure,
which are the elements entering into the calculation of social profits, is derived using
a linear model of the economy which is both an extension and an elaboration of Tin-
bergen's (1966) semi-input-output tramework [15]. In other words, we follow
the "primal" route of quantity and income flows rather than the "dual" route of
shadow prices. This use of the notion of "primal" and "dual" is more than sugges-
tive; for there is an intimate connection between the model developed in this paper
*The authors are associated with the World Bank and the University of California,
Berkeley, respectively. The views expressed-are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect
those of the World Bank. They are indebted to Charles Blitzer and T.N. Srinivasan-for discus-
sions of some of the ideas in this paper but the two gentlemen are not to be held responsible in
any way for the use to which the authors have put them.
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and that which underlies tittle and Mirrlees [9] and Squire and van der Tak [13].
Although this connection will not be analysed in detail here, the concepts and formu-
lations which the two approaches share in common will be discussedas they appear.
Those readers who are more at home with the approach in the manuals should there-
fore find at least a few welcome points of reference as the paper unwinds, while
those who were nurtured on semi-input-output analysis may also fmd it insight-
ful to have this extension laid out explicitly in its context of social cost-benefit anal-
ysis.l .
To illustrate our technique, we apply it to an ex post evaluation of a large-
scale irrigation project in Northwest Malaysia;the Muda River Scheme. The main
reason for the choice of this particular project is that a semi-input-output model of
the project's impact on the Muda region already exists [5]. However, it is also well
known that the Muda Scheme has generated substantial downstream effects on the
surrounding area -- indicating that its selection for a case study is no mere accident.
The paper is structured as follows. The general model is set out in section I.
Its specific application to the analysis of the Muda irrigation project is discussed in
section II, since the use of a regional data base, while appropriate in itself, still
requires a formulation which captures all relevant effects on the national economy.
Section III deals with the estimation of certain parameters which are indispensable
for the cal~ulation of social profitability: the border 'pricesof traded goods; and a
set of social weights for the valuation of private consumption and savingsin terms of
uncommitted government income, which is the numeraire. The profitability cal-
culations themselves are deferred to section IV, and the paper concludes with a brief
discussionof some salient points. '
I. THE MODEL
In this section, we present the linear model which is used to estimate the values
of all the variablesof interest associated with the project's direct and indirect effects.
After a brief description of the sectoral classification employed, the various ingredi-
ents of the model, i.e. the accounts on which it is built, are taken seriatim. At this
point, the model is best thought of as one of a national economy, although its appli-
cation to a regional context is discussedin the next section.
The model is a variant of Tinbergen's (1966) semi-input-output framework
[15]. The M production activities in the economy are divided into two groups:
IWanhill [19] and Kuyvenhoven[8] have tried to synthesizethe Little-Mirrleesand semi-
input-output approaches without alluding to the "primal-dual" distinction. In another paper
[3] , we show why their approach may have departed from the spirit of Little and Mirrlees. , The
only other empirical application of a similar nature known to us is by Seton [12], who attempts
to calculate shadow prices for Chile, allowing for output- and expenditure-linkage effects. Un-
fortunately, as noted in Bell and Devarajan, Seton's otherwise commendable paper is marred by a
theoretical flaw.
-
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those producing tradeables and those producing nontradeables.2 The tradeabIes
sectors have parametrically fixed output levels, i.e. the~ operate at full capacity;
variations in demand are met entirely by changes in net exports. The nontrade-
abIes sectors, on the other hand, respond to changes in demand solely by adjusting
outputs. These sectors either have excess capacity, in which case they are produc-
ing at constant marginal costs, or they add new plant and equipment to satisfy
demand, in which case production takes place at constant average costs. It is also
important to recall that the classification into tradeabIes and nontradeables is not
necessarily a statement about whether or not these commodities are, in fact, traded.
Rather, the distinction is one of the Source of supply response, whether ids net
exports or domestic output. ,
To keep the nationalincomeaccountsconsistent,it isnecessaryto introducea
third type of sector -- for distribution and transportation services-- since export
activities,both exogenousand endogenousalike, purchase those servicesdomestically.
The full rationale for this modification is givenin Bell and Hazell [5].
Material Balances
The subscripts T, D and N denote the set of tradeables, distribution/transport
and nontradeable sectors, respectively. The rows and colunms of the fixed coeffi-
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The submatrix ATN' for example, represents the inputs of tradeables required by the
nontradeables sectors when the latter are operating at unit activity levels.
The material balance equations for the economy are: ,j'
~=~~+~~+~~+~+~+~,+~
XD = ADTXT+ ADDXD+ ADNXN+ CD + GD + JD + Jill
X-AX'




2Tinbergencalls these two types of sectors "international" and "national". To highlight
the relationship of our approach to that of Little and Mirrlees,we haveadopted the terminologyus d by the latter.











are private investment demands,
are net exports, and
is the matrix of trade and transport margins on net exports
accruing to the domestic economy.3
Now equations (1) - (3) are expressed in physical units. By choosing
units of physical measure such that all domestic prices are unity, the same equations
result if everything were measured in value terms, provided the user price of each
commodity (net of transport and distribution margins, which may vary across users)
is the same for all users.
Incomes
The vector of incomes Y = [Yl' ..., Yd earned by the,L household types in
the economy is determined by direct earnings in production and distributed profits.
Let Vkjand Wkj be the direct earningsand dividend payments, respectively, accruing
to the kth household type for each unit of output produced by industry j. Then,
Y = (V + Q)X, '" . . . . . . . . . . . . (4)
where Y = [Xr, Xo ,XN] , Q = [wkj] , V = [vkj] .
Consumption
The gross income of household class k is used to pay lump-sum taxes, Tk '
and income taxes, TkYk ; a constant share, sk ,of post-tax income is saved. Also, a
fixed proportion of its marginal income is spent on the consumption of each good.
These proportions are given by the matrix B,where (3ikis household k's marginal
propensity to consume good i. Denoting the intercept terms of these consumption
functions by 1ik ' and noting that domestic prices are normalised to unity, we have
C = r + B(I- s) [(I - T)Y -f) , . . . . . . . . . (5)
where r = [rik] ; (I - s) , (I - T) are diagonal matrices whosekkth elements are
1 -sk ' 1 - Tk ' respectively; and C is the M x L matrix of household consumption
demands, with cik being household k's expenditure on good i. Now, the matrix C
is made up of three submatrices Cf ' CD ,q~ corresponding to the ~ectoralclassifi.
cation:
3As these margins are earned on gross rather than net flows, the above formulation is
strictly correct only when there are no competitive imports of characteristic commodities which
are exported. In the present application, that is a fair approximation to the observed trade
patterns. The transport and distribution margins on noncompetitive intermediate and consumer
goods are included in ADT' ADD' ADN and CD' respectively. Noncompetitive imports may be
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C = [Cf, CD' CN]'
rhe vectors of consumption demands (Cr ' Co ' CN) in the material balance equa-
tions (1) - (3) are the row sums of the matrices Cf ,CD' CN ,since the former set
of vectors is obtained by aggregatingthe columns of the latter matrices over all house-
hold types.
Government
Government derives its revenue from direct taxes, tariff collections and owner.
ship of state corporations.




where TF is the corporate tax rate and f is the vector of profit margins on gross out.
puts. If o'G is the vector of profit margins on state.owned corporations, the govern.
ment's receipts from these enterprises is o'GX, Finally, let Pi be the ratio of the
world price to the domestic producer price of good i. rhen government revenue
from tariff collections is (P*' - (u' + il') )E,4 where u' is a row vector of ones
(1, 1, ... , 1), and p. is the vector of total trade and transport margins on net exports
which accrue to domestic producers.
We now assume that the government spends its entire revenue. The bundle
(G) of government purchases is given by: a vector (CG) of obligatory purchases for
current consumption (education, health, etc.), a vector (K) of exogenous outlays on
investment goods (project .r~lated expenditure), and a residual whose composition is
fixed. The latter is given by the vector «P, where ,piis the government's outlay on
goods from sector i out of each dollar of the revenue remaining after current con.
sumption and project.related outlays. Wehave, therefore,
G = K + CG + «pu'(G - K - CG),
where G = [Gr, GO ' GN] .
Equating the government's purchases to its revenue yields
(6)
u'G = t'y + u'T + (TFt' + 0') X + (P*' - (u' + P.'» E,
where t' = (Tl'''', TL)'
It is now necessary to relate government revenues (and purchases) as defmed
here to the concept of "uncommitted social income, measured in terms of convert.
ible foreign exchange", which is the numeraire advocated by little and Mirrlees
'" (7)
4when the sum of the trade and distr~bution margins ( Pj) on net exports of a commodity
accrue to domestic'producers,'the ex-tariff f.o.b. price of the exports is (1 + Pj).
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[9, pp. 145-151]. In our model, the impact of a project on government revenue in
a particular time period is simply the change in u'G associated with the project, i.e.
the difference between u'G in equilibrium with the project and u'G in equilibrium
without the project. As K is the set of government purchases required to put the
project into effect, the changein u' (G - K -CG) arising from the project will measure
the change in social income available for commitment to other uses only if there is
no change in public consumption, CG' Furthermore, as the model's formulation of
the international trade regime is implicitly that of the "small country" case, this
change in "uncommitted social income" will indeed take the form of a change in the
holdings of foreign exchange reserves provided the notion of "uncommitted" is not
taken too literally.5 Since the government can exchange one tradeable good against
another in any quantity it desires at fixed world prices, its marginal income is in
effect "uncommitted", in the sense that the composition of its marginal purchases
does not matter,jf there are no allocations for the purchase of nontradeables, Le. if
«PDand «PNare both zero. Hence, by setting all t/J{sill equation (6) equal to zero,
ejlC.ceptthat for noncompetitive imports (which will be unity), and by keeping CG
invariant with respect to K, the project's effects on "uncommitted social income,
measured in terms of convertible foreign exchange" is simply the associated change
in u' (G - K - CG)'
Savings and Investment
- A crucial feature of the model developed here is that private investment is as-
sumed to be fmanced solely'by private (household and corporate) savings. While
this is a plausible assumption in a national setting, it introduces certain difficulties
in the context of a regional economy, which will be discussedin a later section.
Taking corporate savings to be equal to undistributed net-of-tax corporate
profits, we have:
u'J= \i'S + [(1 - TF)f - u'n] X , (8)
where J ~ [JT,JD ,IN] and S = [SI"'" Sd, withSk= sk [(1-Tk)Yk- Tk]'
Investment demand in this model has two components. First, "balancing" in-
vestment may be needed to release capacity bottlenecks in the nontradeables sec-
tors, as the economy moves from one steady state to another: this is denoted by the
vector H. Secondly, there is "voluntary" investment, which is taken to be the resid-
,ual investible funds allocated in fixed proportions (1/Ji)across the various sectors.
Thus, , .
J = H + \}Iu (J - H) . (9)
SThis is a consequence of the fact that the economy is in balance-of-payments equilib-
rium; as is shownbelow in this section.
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It should be noted that in order to value private investment in the social cost-
benefit calculation, we must know the distribution of investment demands among
households (since, presumably, investment by poor households will be socially more
valuable than that by rich ones). However,since our data do not permit this levelof
disaggregation,we are forced to represent private investment by a single vector, im-
plicitly assuming that the composition of investment demand is the same across
households.
The particular set of assumptions we have made also guarantees balance of
payments equilibrium for the economy, that is, P*'E ==O. This is readily seen by
adding equations (1) - (9) and setting pricesequal to costs at domestic prices.
Now the linear system (1) - (9) has 4M + L linearly independent equations in
5M + L unknowns. To solve the system, therefore, we must specify M of the un-
knowns as exogenous. For tradeable goods, we fix the level of outputs, XT' and
solve for ET ; whilst for the other two subsets of sectors, we specify ED and EN ' and
solvefor XD and XN'
SocialCost-Benefit Analysis
Schematically,the above model can be represented as follows:
Z = A*Q + A**u, ... . . . . . . . . . . .. (10)
where Q and Z are the vectors of exogenous and endogenousvariables, respectively,
and the system's parameters enter into the elements of the matrices A* and A**.
For example, Q contains the output levels of the tradeabies sectors, whereas Z con-
tains their corresponding net export levels. By solving for Z, given Q in (10), we
take into account all multiplier effects consistent with the rflodel.
To determine the impact of a project, we first specify the values taken by the
exogenous variables,Q, for the economy with the project, and solve for the endog-
enous variables, Z. Next, we draw a hypothetical picture of the economy as it
would have been in the absence of the project. If, as is usual, the project has an
effect on the technology employed in its own sector, or even elsewherein the econo-
my, one or both of the matrices A* and A** will be different in the hypothetical,
"without-project" case from the "with-project" case. With the new technologies
and the exogenousvariablesQO specifiedfor the "without-project"case,equation
(10) can be solved for ZO, the values of the endogenous variables when the pro-
ject is not undertaken. The difference between the ordered pairs of vectors (Q, Z)
and (Qo, ZO),then, represents the project's impact on the economy.
Now, how can the project's impact on outputs, incomes, savings,etc. be used
to determine "social profit", the contribution of the project to social welfare in a
given year? The arguments of the little-Mirrlees social profit function are: private
consumption; private savings over and above that needed to fmance the balancing
investments in the nontradeables sectors; and uncommitted public income. Here, it
will be assumed that the weights for private savingsand consumption relative to
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over the relevant ranges of these variables, ranges which may be quite large. Hence,
the socialprofit, t.U , associatedwith the project for a unit time period is givenby
t.U = u' (G - GO- K) -I- u' (C - CO)A + f(S - SO)
+ ~p[(I -TpH' -u'Q] (X-XO) - ~HH. ...
'-
(11)
where the vectors A and ~denote, respectively, the social valuations of a unit increase
in the levels of consumption and savings for each of the household classes; ~p is the
social valuation of a unit of retained corporate profits; and ~H is the social valuation
of the savings which fmance the balancing investment, H, whose composition by
source may differ from that for savingsas a whole. .
It is important to note that (II) departs from little and Mirrleesin that the
weights A , ~ , ~p and ~H are, applied to private consumption and savings measured
at market prices as opposed to accounting prices. In their discussionof this choice,
little and Mirrlees [9, pp. 236-237] seem to be concerned principally with the fact
that different consumers may pay different prices for the same good. Paced with
this difficulty, they suggest,as a short-cut, that consumers' expenditures be valued at
accounting prices. Although we do not fmd this a very appealing suggestion for
making 'baskets' of goods purchased at different market pricescomparable with one
another, it is the only strictly correct way of comparing consumers' expenditures
,with uncommitted social income unless the consumer's consumption conversion fac.
tors happen to be the same. However, as little and Mirrleesrecognise, an assess-
ment of equity among consumers requires comparisons of their expenditures (or
incomes) at market prices, even though this rryaymean that incomes of two people
which differ greatly at market prices may differ little at accounting prices -- and
hence be of roughly the same social value if their short-cut method is adopted.
Wehave formulated exactly this issue of equity among consumersat the possi.
ble cost of introducing some errors into the valuation of their expenditure relative to
the numeraire. Indeed, since the method advanced here is designed to fmessethe
task of estimating accounting prices for nontradeables and shadow wage rates, we
have no choice in the matter. As for the possibility that different people may pay
different prices for the same good, the region under study is blessed with a good.
transportation system. Moreover, the provincial capital is both modest in scale and
readily accessible to all rural households, so iliat urban and rural cost of livingindex-
es probably differ little.
To complete the evaluation of the project, the stream of social profits, as given
by equation (U), generated by the project throughout its lifetime is discounted at






II. APPLYINGTHE MODELTO THE MUDAIRRIGATIONPROJECT
The model set out in section II describes the flows within a national economy
and those to and from the rest of the world. But in applying the model to evaluate -
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the Muda scheme, we employ data pertaining to a particular region, namely, the pro-
ject's impact region. The region encompasses the state of PerIis and about half of
Kedah, in northwest Malaysia. The rationale for this regional, rather than a national,
data base is that a social accounts matrix for the impact area has already been esti-
mated [4] and, indeed, a semi-input-output model has been applied to it [5].
However, although the basic structure of the model in section I is preserved if the
data pertain to a region, some additional assumptions must be made if the results are
to be interpreted correctly.
Pirst, there are primary commodities which do not normally enter internation-
al trade until they are processed, but which are shipped in raw form from the produc-
ing region to other regions for processing. In the. present case, there' are two such
goods: paddy and smoked rubber sheet. Until the advent of irrigation in 1970, the
region's net exports of paddy were roughly zero. Thereafter, 'the surge in the
region's paddy output resulted in substantial exports of paddy to rice mills in south-
ern Kedah and Province Wellesley, as the capacity of the region's milling sector did
not expand rapidly enough to keep pace. Only in the late 'seventies was the region's
capacity sufficient to, mill the whole of the region's paddy crop. As for rubber, less
than 15 percent of the output of the region's smallholders and estate sectors is pro-
cessed within the region itself. Strictly speaking, therefore, these two commodities
should be treated as "tradeables" with respect to the region. Yet, the processingof
paddy and rubber generates value added within the Malaysianeconomy, and the mul-
tiplier effects of this value added would go unaccounted for i~the model were appli-
ed literally. To correct for this, processing activities outside the region are treated in
the model as if they took place inside the region, which entails the assumption that
technologies, the distributions of value added among households and the levels of
household incomes do not vary across regions. As this comparison involvesnorth-
ern Kedah on the one hand and southern Kedah and ProvinceWellesleyon the other,
all of them rather poor regions, the accompanying assumption seemsdefensible.
Secondly, by no means is the whole of private savingsinvested in the region it-
self. The outflow of private capital from the region, much of it through the banking
system, was especially large in 1972 and for some years thereafter. Very little is
known about the uses to which these savingsare put, and for want of anything better,
it has been assumed that they are used to finance the purchase of a bundle of invest-
ment goods whose composition is the same as that of the region's .own investment
activities. As all private savingsare invested in'the model presented above, the pro-
cedure adopted here IStantamount to incorporating within the region those activities
making deliveries to meet investment demands outside the region which are also fi.
nanced by the region's savings.
Now both of these 'enlargements' of the region's activities,whether by raising
output, and hence income, in the tradeable sectors, or by increasingthe demand for
investment goods frQm the nontradeable sectors, will lead to further rounds of in-
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creases in incomes and the output of the nontradeable sectors. Thus, the results
from the model will not square with those for the Muda region reported in Belland
Hazell [5], which are derived from a closely related semi-input-output model featur-
ing exports of paddy and smoked rubber sheet as well as exogenously fixed invest-
ment. In particular, value added will be much higher in the 'extended' region de-
scribed here. Moreover, as there is a risein output in all the sectors producing non-
tradeabies in all of the other spatial regions of the economy thus affected, the ear-
lier assumption of homogeneous technologies, distributions of value added among
households and household income levelsis not only vital, but also far stronger than it
appears to beat first sight. Be that as it may, the data admit of nothing better.
Certainly, such assumptions of homogeneity are every bit in keeping with those
employed in estimating 'national' shadow prices in the literature on social cost -bene-
fit analysis.
A third consideration in the interpretation of the model's results rises from the
fact that there is a stream of seasonalworkers into the Muda region during the paddy
harvesting period. Some of these agricultural workers come from southern Kedah
and Kelantan, but others come from Thailand. The former belong to households
whose income levels are, in all probability, at best equal to those enjoyed by landless
paddy farm households in the Muda region. Hence, at one extreme, the migrants'
seasonal earnings could be simply lumped in with those of Muda's landless house-
holds, on the assumption that the output foregone in their home regions is zero.
Alternatively, it can be assumed that their seasonal earnings in Muda are exactly
equal to the output.foregone elsewherein the economy, both valued at market prices.
The assumption underlying the results presented below rests somewhat uneasily in
between, inasmuch as all payments to seasonal workers, Malay and Thai alike, are
treated as imports used in paddy production. This is undeniably rough and ready,
but the sums involved are small and hardly worthy of more elaborate treatment.
However, there is one respect in which payments to Malay and Thai seasonalwork-
ers must be distinguished: presumably the Malaysiangovernment attaches no social
value to extra income enjoyed by Thai workers, whereas it ought to smile on addi-
tional income accruing to poor Malay agricultural workers. For this reason, pay-
ments to Malay seasonal workers must feature in an appropriate way.in the calcula-
tion of the project's stream of social profits.
With this classification, the next step in the calculation of the project's social
profitability is to set up a pair of vectors of exogenous variables for each year of the
project's expected lifetime, one denoting the estimated actual values of such variables
and the other their estimated values in the hypothetical event that the project had
not been undertaken. Construction work on the project began in a small way
.in 1965, reached a peak in 1967 and 1968, and then tailed off steadily to comple-
tion in 1972. Irrigation commencedon a small scalein 1970. By 1972, about three-







full maturity. However, 1974 was also an abnormal year where the ratio of the
domestic to the world price of rice is concerned. The ratio ruling in 1975 seems
more representative of the conditions likely to hold over the project's lifetime.
Hence, assuming that a steady state ruled after 1975, this chronicle of events appears
to entail the estimation of no fewer than 22 separate vectors of exogenous variables
-- a daunting task indeed.
Fortunately, it turns out that during that part of the project construction pe-
riod when no output is produced, it suffices to estimate the two sets of exogenous
variaDlesfor just one year. For recall from equation (l0) that so long as A* and
A** are unchanged, i.e. there are no changes in technology and expenditure pro-
pensities, the change in the levelsof the endogenous variablesis givenby:
Z - Zo == A* (Q - QO) . (10')
Now if during this phase of the project, the members of the sequence of exogenous
vectors [Q - QO] are scalar multiples of one another -- in this case, Q - QO is the
project's demands for investment deliveries from the construction sector -- the
membersof the sequence[Z - ZO] are likewise. Hence,bnce the sequenceof
[Q- QO] hasbeenestimated,it is enoughto estimateonememberof the sequence
of [Z - ZO] in orderto arriveat the rest. Theyearactuallychosenfor this purpose
is 1967, in keeping with the discussionin [5] .
Once the project begins to produce an output stream, however, A* will change
continuously until the project reaches maturity. Hence, in principle, it is necessary
to estimate
Z - ZO = A*Q - A*oQo (10")
for all years after 1970, the matrix A** being unaltered by the project.
In the present case, the pair of vectors (Q, QO)had already been estimated for
the years 1967, 1972 and 1974 in connection with the model in [5]. To keep the
amount of additional work within reasonable bounds, it was decided to estimate (A*,
A*O)and (Q, QO)for 1970 alone and to use linear interpolation in order to arriveat
the valuesof releventvariablesfor the intervening 'transitional' years, 1971 and 1973.
Naturally, the estimation procedure for these sets of variables for 1970 followed
closely that in the Bell-Hazellpaper [5]. In brief, the paddy production technolo-
gies entering into A* and A*° were taken to be output-weighted averagesof the
corresponding technologies for 1967 "and1972. Apart from the obvious difference
of deliveriesfrom the construction sector in the presence of the project, Q departs
from QO by virtue of the additional paddy output following irrigation and extra
throughput in the region's rice mills. There is a small fall in rubber output and proc-
essingas labour is drawn off into paddy harvesting activities. Also,exogenous taxes
change somewhat as farmers benefit from irrigation subsidies and rising regional ac-
tivities swell tax receipts from vehicle and business registration fees.
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Finally, it should be noted that the'model employed here features two sets of
parameters, namely, <I»and 'IT, which are not found in [5]. As already explained in
section I, residual government purchases are allocated entirely to noncompetitive
imports. The vector 'ITdenotes the composition of demand for investment goods
by the private sector after all necessary purchases of 'balancing' investments have
been made. A critical assumption underlying the estimation of 'ITis that the share of
noncompetitive imports in total outlays on such investments stayed constant at its
1972 level. That being so, 'ITvariedlittle up to 1970, thereby keeping A* invariant
. to all intents and purposes. It showedonlyslightyear-to-yearvariationthereafter,
so it seems reasonable to assume that there were no fluctuations after 1974, when
the project attained its steady state configuration.
III. ESTIMATION OF NATIONAL PARAMETERS
FOR SOCIAL COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
The estimation of the parameters of the model [equations (1) - (9)] has been
described in [5]. Our additions to that model, namely, the vectors <I»and 'IT, were
discussedin the preceding section. In this section, we derive the national parameters
which are necessary for applying the model's results.to a socialcost-benefit calcula.
tion.
Four sets of national parameters are used in our calculus: (i) the accounting
ratios of traded goods, that is the ratio of their world price to their domestic price;
(ii) the social valuation, in terms of uncommitted social income, of a unit of private
consumption enjoyed by each household class (the vector X); (iiJ) the social valua-
tion of private savingsin terms of the numeraire (~); and (iv) the.-accountingrate of
interest. These are taken seriatim.
Veitch [1.7] estimates accounting ratios for our ten tradeable sectors for 1974.
Except for the two rice millingsectors, we assumethese ratios were the same through.
out the period under study. Since the ratio of the world to the domestic price of
rice changed considerably over the period 1967-1975, and rice is the sole direct out-
put of the .project, the accounting ratio for rice was estimated separately for each
year in this period. This set of accounting ratios is laid out in Table 1.
Table 1



















Source: [7] and [10].












The two unobservable sectors in our economy which export significant
amounts (albei.tin exogenously fixed quantities) are "other agriculture"and "manu-
facturing n.e.c.". Their accounting ratios were estimated by using ratios of those
categories in Veitch which correspond most closely to their characteristic commodi.
ties. Finally, the accounting ratio for noncompetitive imports was derived by taking
a weighted average of the different imports, the weights being obtained from the
original SAM tableau. The complete set of accounting ratios for 1974 is given in
Table 2.
Table 2




























*No paddy is in fact exported, and so the value of unity is used solely for accounting
requirements.
To estimate X, the set of social weights for household consumption, two pa.
rameters are needed: c, the so-calledcritical per capita consumption level, at which a
unit of additional consumption (valued at market prices) is just as valuable sociallyas
a unit of uncommitted government income; and 71, the elasticity of the marginalutil.
ity of consumption. Where c is concerned, it is reasonable to take the official
"poverty line", on the grounds that a prime objective of government policy is to
bring all individuals to that level of living as soon as possible. At present, the value
of c in 1972 prices is M$375.5 per annum [18, p. 29], which is about one.third of
per capita GDP. It is difficult to be so defInite about 71. Following a well-
established tradition in this literature, two values will be used: unity, which arises
from a logarithmic utility function and is mildly egalitarian; and two, which
corresponds to Atkinson's [2] equally distributed equivalent income being the
harmonic mean of all incomes and is quite strongly egalitarian.
178 Bell and Devarajan
Now as indicated by Bell and Hazell [5], the project brought about large
changes in the per capita consumption levels of the five classes of households.
Hence, the concavity of the utility function implies that potentially serious errors
will arise if A is estimated at the steady state values of household consumption.
Instead, we proceed as follows. In viewof equation (11), two additional parameters
of the utility function may be fixed. First, the marginal social utility of a unit of
private consumption at c should be unity. Secondly, the absolute social utility
attached to a private consumption level of c should be C. ,Hence, we have, for
17= I and 1/= 2, respectively,
V(c) = c[1 + loge (c/c)]
V(c) = c[2 - C/c]
. . . (12a)
. . . (12b)
The value of A 1).risingfrom a movement from COto c is, therefore,
A = [V(c) - V(CO)]/[c - CO] . . ., (13)
The per capita consumption levelsof the various classesof household for 1967
and 1974, both with and without the project, are taken from [5], while those for
1972 with the project have been estimated directly in the course of constructing the
SAM for that year. Those for 1970 and 1972 (without the project) were derivedby
linear interpolation. The resulting values of Aare set out in Table 3. There is no
call for the (spurious) accuracy of similar calculations for the intervening years.
Up to 1970, the valueson for 1967 will do; those for 1972 will be applied to 1971;





In placing a socialvalue on a household's savings,Little and Mirrlees[9, p. 243]
make the suggestion that, as a short-cut, the weight attached to a unit of savingsby
household class k, ~k' be taken as half way between unity, i.e. the weight for un-
committed government income, and the weight for a unit of consumption by that
household. Of course, if the latter exceeds un~ty,the rule of thumb implies that the
households concerned are deemed to be saving "too much", given their poverty.
Using the little-Mirrlees rule of thumb, the sets of weights for household savings
corresponding to those for consumption followat once from Table 3. As for corpo-
rate savings, which are ultimately distributed to very rich household or foreign
nationals, these will generally have a very low social valuation. In the light of the
social weight attached to the savingsof nonfarm households, perhaps a weight of 0.2
for corporate savingswould not be objectionable. Finally, there is the matter of the
socialvaluation of the savingsneeded to finance the set of "balancing" investinents,H.
Most of these investments were undertaken in the nonfarm sector of the economy
between 1970 and 1974, by incorporated and unincorporated enterprises alike, while
others took the form of house construction or improvement by farm households.
Accordingly,in rather rough and n,ady fashion, the valueof~H is taken to be 0.7.
The argument advanced above rests on the notion that all households have
access to a perfect capital market and so earn the same real rate of return on their
savings. In practice, poorer households in the Muda region are likely to place their
fmancial savingsin bank accounts yielding zero or negative real rates of return, to the
advantage of affluent borrowers who have access to highly profitable investment
opportunities. If, in the extreme, all household savingswere placed in the banking
system and then lent to the government, to the richest cl31sSof households, or to
private corporations, then the social weight attached to all savings,irrespective of
source, would lie somewhere in the range of those for these three institutional
categories, depending on their shares in the total volume of lending. Very little is
known about these matters, and it is profitless to attempt a refmed calculation.
Moreover, since the purpose of setting up this extreme caseis to establish a parame-
ter value for sensitivity analysis, a social weight of 0.7 for all private savingsshould
provide a plausible lower bound on the valuation of this stream of outcomes flowing
from the project.
Turning to the accounting rate of interest (ARl), Anand [1] arrivesat an esti-
mate for Malaysia of ten percent. This is close to the rate at which Malaysiacan
borrow from the world market. As the country's balance of payments position was
quite strong in the period 1967-1974, and as foreign reserveshave remained high
since then, a nominal rate of nine or ten percent appears plausible. However, the
model set out here is formulated in constant (domestic) prices. Adjusting for an
average annual inflation rate of five percent and assuming exchange rate stability
against an appropriate basket of currencies, we estimate the ARI to be around five
percent. On the other hand, it may be felt that public sector projects should have
Table 3
Social Weights for Household Consumption at Market Prices
1967 1970 1972 1974
Household Class
A(1) A(2) A(1) A(2) 'A(1) A(2) A(1) A(2)
1 Landless 3.25 10.53 2.62 6.90 2.29 5.39 2.14 4.70
2 Labour abundant 2.37 5.63 2.11 4.45 1.83 3.41 1.61 2.63
3 Land abundant 1.54 2.36 1.38 1.92 1.19 1.43 1.03 1.08
4 Nonproject farm 1.75 3.09 1.59 2.55 1.39 1.94 1.25 1.42
5 Nonfarm 0.78 0.61 0.73 0.53 0.63 0.41 0.53 0.29
A(1/) denotes the value of A evaluatedat 1/= 1,2.
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a higher rate of return than the marginal cost of foreign borrowing, so that this figure
of five percent is probably a lower bound. To reflect this consideration, we perform
sensitivity experiments using figuresof five, ten and twenty percent for the ARI.
N. SOCIALCOST-BENEFITCALCULATIONS
Recalling equation (11), the stream of social profits generated by the project
is made up of various elements: the project's effects on household consumption and
savings,on retained corporate profits and on government income. It is worthwhile
setting out the individual trajectories of these elements before weighting them to-
gether to yield the time path of social profits, for the positive basis of the subsequent
normativeaggregationis then clear. .
The trajectories are laid out in Table 4. There is nothing very startling about
them, given the nature of the project. In the construction ,phase, the 'government
made large outlays on construction, which accrued, in the first instance, as incomes
to nonfarm households and corporations, both domestic and foreign. Agricultural
households participated only marginally in this activity and the extra activity in
other domestic sectors induced in its wake. After the project came on stream in
1970, the incomes of agricultural households rose rapidly, with expenditures out of
these incomes boosting nonfarm incomes and corporate profits as project construc-
tion wound down. Government income increased too, as revenues from income and
indirect taxes increased by more than enough to offset the losses arising out of the
effective protection afforded to the paddy sector in all years but 1974 (see Table 1).
The outlays on "balancing" investments are the higher of the two (rather rough) esti-
mates discussed in [5], just to be on the safe side. The various flows for 1975 are
assumed to be the steady state values of relevant variables for the rest of the project's
life.
The stream of social profits associated' with the flows in Table 4 has been cal-
culated under four sets of assumptions about the social valuation of household con-
sumption, savingsand corporate profits. These correspond to t~o valuesof the elas-
ticity of the marginal utility of consumption and two methods of placing a social
valuation on household savings and retained corporate profits, as already discussed
in the previous section. By way of comparison, and to satisfy those who would have
no truck with distributional weights to value private consumption and savings in
terms. of government income, the stream of social profits has also been claculated
with all such weights set to unity.
These alternative streams are set out in Table 5. In all cases, the project's net
present social valueis handsomely positive at an accounting rate of interest of 10 per-
cent, and it can get by even at 20 percent. Thus, the great improvements in the
material standards of people living in the Muda region which have been brought
about by the project -- at once evident to the casual observer -- are complement-




























































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: (a) 17is the elasticity-of the marginal social utility of private consumption.
(b) Under 17= 1 and 17= 2, in case (A) the social weights for private savings (~k) are
drawn from Table 3 using the rule ~k =[1 +\ (17)] /2, while in case (B), a unifotm
weight of 0.7 applies to an private savmgs.
(c) The values for 1975 are assumed to be those for the steadY state, the lifetime of the
project being 45 years.
makes very little difference to the project's net present social vlaue, even at the e.x-
treme ends of its range. Nor does the method of valuing private savingshave much
of an impact on its profitability. That the net present value is almost identical
(given the ARI) at 17= 0 and 17 = 2, but somewhat lower at 17= 1, is interesting.
For 17= 2, the higher social valuesplaced on government outlays early in the project's
life happen to be counterbalanced by the large net soqial benefits associated with
the high incomes accruing to the project's comparatively poor beneficiaries when it
attained maturity. When the social utility function is less concave, the phasing and
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distribution of the stream of private incomes has such a form as to cause a reduction
in the project's net present social vlaue.
~- V. CONCLUSIONS
-,~
It is clear that the analytical approach adopted here rests explicitly on the use
of a simple general equilibrium model of the economy to determine a set of endog-
enous variableswith all goods prices,domesticand foreign alike, parametrically given.
Starting from an initial equilibrium for the economy, which is characterised by the
conditions set out in the first section, a "project" takes the form of a sequence of
disturbances in the economy's exogenous variables and underlying technology. As-
surning full adjustment of the system to these exogenous changes within the unit
time period which defines each point of the sequence, the time path followed by the
system's variables may be forged out of the chain of comparative static equilibria
corresponding to the sequence of exogenous variables. The criterion for acceptance
is that the net present social value of the change in national income, as given by
equation (11), should be positive.
The implicit assumption of instantaneous and full adjustment to exogenous dis-
turbances, which entails, in this case, myopic expectations, is certainly very strong.
Yet the "dual" route of using shadow prices is tarred with the same brush [14].
Perhaps nothing better can be done where practical analysis is concerned, but this
does not exonerate the analyst of the responsibility to be clear about what he or she
is doing. Even if a truly dynamic structure were available, it is far from obvious
a priori that the costs of such intrinsically difficult refinements would be justified by
the improvements in practical decisions they would bring about. Still, one is left
feeling uncomfortable that the results should rest on such foundations -- unless one
seeks refuge in the convention that projects are small enough for these considerations
not to matter.
A more particular point to emerge from the analysis is that the only inter-
industry linkages which have an induced -- as opposed to a direct -- effect on the
determination of the endogenous variables a~ethose expressed by the technologies
for producing nontradeables. This followsimmediately from the serni-input-output
formulation, of course; but it does serve to highlight the fact that capturing "multi-
plier" effects in cost-benefit analysis requires, in principle, that the estimates of the
relevant parameters pertain to the region in question. As LDCsare usually regional-
ly heterogenous; this cannot be dismissed as a theoretical nicety. However, the
analyst usually considers himself fortunate if he has access to a fairly recent national
input-output table. Again, the same applies in the case of households' expenditure
patterns.
MoviI:1gon to issuesin social cost-benefit analysis,in this particular case study,
variations in the :elasticityof the marginal social utility of private consumption have
little impact on the project's present socialvlaue ~- at least within the rangeof
;.
-'
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Table 5
Social Profits from the Project (M$ '000 in 1972 Prices)
(a) Stream of Undiscounted Social Profits
17 = 1 17 = 2
Year 17 = 0
B A BA
1965 - 498 - 548 - 525 - 553 - 529
1966 - 1,153 -1,343 - 1,255 - 1,361 - 1,271
1967 - 2,613 - 3,179 - 2,931 - 3,234 - 2,980
1968 - 3,749 - 4,485 - 4,173 -;-4,551 - 4,231
1969 - 5,706 - 6,398 - 5,987 - 6,261 - 6,027
1970 516 778 822 1,979 1,956
1971 405 539 533 1,753 1,659
1972 2,892 3,248 3,159 2,080 4,899
1973 8,946 8,292 8,225 9,190 9,111
1974 13,505 12,561 12,443 13,633 13 ,502
1975 12,253 11 ,096 10,969 12,213 12,068
(b) Net Present Social Value of the Project
ARI
17 = 1 17 = 2
17 = 0
A B A B
5% 129,823 115,743 115,200 131,306 130,270
10% 46,480 40,524 40,705 47,616 47,501
20% 7,924 5,785 6,183 8,171 8,424
184 Bell and Devarajan
values considered "normal" in this literature. The project's main beneficiaries are
poor, and hence socially deserving. However, the social rate of return exceeds 20
percent, even when all incomes are giventhe same social weight.
Once the model has been built and estimated, it can be used to evaluate any
project. Computationally, nothing more than matrix inversion is needed. Evenso,
this invites the retort that valuing the direct inputs and outputs of a project at their
(appropriate) shadow prices is more straightforward still, assumingthat a set of such
shadow prices is available. That, however, raises a question which goes far beyond
the scope of this paper: what are the shadow prices which correspond to the primal
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